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Abstract: This article proposes that the normative context of the use of force is being 
modified by a new way to implement the Protection of Civilians (PoC). Resolution 2098 of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) created a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) with 
an unprecedented mandate to implement the use of force preemptively. In this context, the 
objective of this paper is to evidence that the FIB‘s offensive actions resulted in the 
emergence of the ―Islands of Stability‖ concept, which represents a new method to implement 
the PoC. In order to elaborate this method, a review of literature, news papers and official 
documents was undertaken, as well as interviews with MONUSCO officials. Its outcome is a 
significant update, adaptation and evolution on the use of force in peace operations that aims 
to influence the general debate regarding military intervention and PoC. 
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ILHAS DE ESTABILIDADE: NOVA CONCEPÇÃO DO USO DA FORÇA PARA A 
IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DA PROTEÇÃO DE CIVIS 
Resumo: Este artigo propõe que o contexto normativo sobre o uso da força está sendo 
modificado por uma nova forma de implementação da Proteção de Civis (PoC). A Resolução 
2098 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas criou uma Força de Brigada de 
Intervenção (FIB) com mandato sem precedentes para implementar o uso da força 
preventivamente. Neste contexto, o objetivo deste trabalho é evidenciar que as ações 
ofensivas da FIB resultaram na emergência do conceito de ―Ilhas de Estabilidade‖, 
apresentando novo método de operacionalização da PoC. A fim de explanar este método, foi 
efetuada revisão de literatura, de matérias jornalísticas e de documentos oficiais, além de 
entrevistas com oficiais da MONUSCO. Verificou-se significativa atualização, adaptação e 
evolução do uso da força em operações de paz que influencia o debate geral sobre a 
intervenção militar e a PoC. 
Palavras-Chave: Uso da força, MONUSCO, FIB, Proteção de Civis, Ilhas de Estabilidade. 
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Introduction 
 
Normative evolution is a legal rationalization of the modern state system‘s structure. 
Since the nineteenth century, more and more recognition of these rules have been codified in 
international law and regimes, and in official mandates of international organizations. The use 
of force against a member of international society, subject to the rules and regulations 
formulated mainly by the most powerful units, is tied to the normative context of each 
international order according to the interpretation of State duty. (Finnemore, 2004: p.2) 
The United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO), started in 1948, are within this 
context. The understanding of new State‘s responsibilities justified the implementation of the 
use of force to ensure human security, representing a different interpretation of how and why 
the force should be applied. 
In this regard, the UNSC Resolution 2098 of March 2013 authorized the creation of 
the FIB in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo – 
MONUSCO. For the first time in the history of PKO under the edge of this organization, the 
use of force was allowed to neutralize armed groups. (Braga, 2010) The active engagement of 
FIB enabled the political, military, and humanitarian aspects of MONUSCO to be jointly 
adapted in order to influencing the operation of the PoC and contributing to further develop 
the concept of "Islands of Stability." If previously, as in the case of MINUSTAH (United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti), peacekeepers watched static the violations of human 
rights, in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the FIB started to employ robust actions 
preemptively to prevent these violations.
 2
  
Study of this issue is necessary as the application of the ―Islands of Stability‖ may 
change the method in which PoC is implemented. Since the debate is ongoing in the UNSC, 
and with think tanks, specialists, and state members criticizing this method, it is appropriate to 
investigate the actions and mandate of the FIB and the application of the concepts of ―Islands 
of Stability‖ and PoC. 
This article aims to analyze how the PoC‘s implementation has been modified 
through Resolution 2098, the FIB and its unprecedented authorization to use force. To this 
end, this paper will be divided into three parts: first, it will outline the normative evolution of 
the use of force in the modern State‘s system; then, it will summarize the main features of the 
five generations of peace operations and the human security debate; and subsequently, it will 
                                                          
2
 Robust peacekeeping operations are peacekeeping missions conducting offensive military operations.  
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expose the concept of "Islands of Stability" taking into account the experience of MONUSCO 
and its influence on the PoC‘s application. 
 
1) Normative evolution of the use of force in international relations. 
 
New standards creation in the international system is a result of State's conduct 
changes in relation to sovereignty, individual, or the right to go to war. As reported by 
Finnemore, international relations normative process is directly linked to military intervention 
since international standards are not divorced from State‘s power and interest. On the 
contrary, ―(...) rules about intervention are strongly if not entirely shaped by actions of powerful 
states that actually have the capacity to intervene (...).‖ Therefore, in the author‘s view, constant 
modifications in the regulatory context appoint alterations in military interventions. In this 
sense, international order in each period of the history of States system is set by a different 
regulatory framework, regarding to the right to intervene and to the interpretation of the 
principle of sovereignty. (Finnemore, 2004: p.5)  
Within the limits of absolutism era, States sovereignty was related to the fact that 
states ―acted however they pleased within their own jurisdictions.‖ (Bellamy, 2009: p.8)  In 
the nineteenth century, the construction and definition of intervention itself, as a category of 
military action distinguished from war, was adapted to the political changes and military 
behavior.
3
 In previous time of the League of Nations Pact, in 1919, to the conclusion of the 
Briand-Kellogg Pact of proscription of war of aggression, in 1928, and the very Charter of the 
United Nations, in 1945, sovereignty was understood as the practice in which States ―enjoyed 
a right to go to war‖ based on realpolitik.
4
 (Finnemore, 2004: p.12) In the post-colonial period - 
after 1945 - sovereignty started to have a direct relationship with the statement that all people 
had the right to self-determination, right to determine their political status and their economic, 




In the late twentieth century, self-determination notion was relativized by the 
humanitarian idea. Based in the new interpretation of the State duty or the State's obligation to 
                                                          
3
 ―Intervention, as a nineteenth-century practice within Europe, was understood to be aimed at governments 
rather than territory and so provided a way of bringing about political change without disturbing the Vienna 
boundaries and territorial settlement that underpinned the entire European order of the period.‖ 
4
 Realpolitik is a German term related to power politics. It emphasizes politics based on practical power over 
politics embedded on moral and ethical principles.  
5
 This understanding of sovereignty was an attempt to avoid reemergence of colonialism. 
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ensure security to its citizens, other standards were added to the international law, discussing 
what came to be known as humanitarian intervention.
 
(Hoffmann apud Herz, 2010) 
Humanitarian interventions are equally related to the normative transformation on 
the use of force in international politics.
 
(Ricobem, 2010) Discussed mainly in the UN, the 
comprehension of military intervention is embedded in its Charter. According to Tardy, the 
United Nations Charter is the most detailed document that regulates the use of force in the 
modern State‘s system. The author defends that ―after a few inconclusive attempts, such as 
the Treaty of Versailles instituting the League of Nations (1919) and the Kellogg–Briand Pact 
(1928), the UN Charter put forth the most detailed framework regarding the use of force.‖ 
(Tardy, 2007) 
Over time, humanitarian interventions, also known as peace operations, suffered 
progressive conceptual and practical changes in their nature; evolution proven in resolutions 
of the UNSC that legitimize the actions of multilateral military forces  in the crises and 
conflicts‘ pacific or coercive solution.
6
 Employed as a tool for reactive actions of the 
international community, represented by the United Nations, peace operations serve as 
response to threats to international peace and security. 
 
2) The five generations of UN PKO and the concept of PoC. 
 
From its characteristics, Kenkel divided the UN PKO in five generations.
7
 (Kenkel, 
2013: p. 125) The period between 1956 and 1987 was marked by the peak of peacekeeping 
operations defined as "classic", "traditional" or "first generation," most of them under 
mandates that aimed monitoring ceasefires, truces and armistices, patrolling borders and 
excluded military zones, supporting the withdrawal of troops and monitoring of negotiations 
for definitive peace treaties.
8
 (Taylor apud Baylis, Smith, 2006: p.412) After the Cold War, 
PKO were termed as "second generation,"
9
 (Malan, 1998: p.2) which in line with Mark 
                                                          
6
 Multilateral means the active participation of troop contributing countries in operations since the UN does not 
have its own military force. 
7
 Conceptually, peace operations are divided in generations by expert scholars in the field. There is no consensus 
on how they are divided.   
8
 Traditional peacekeeping operations involve the establishment of a group of observers or a military peace force 
under the command of the UN, which should be unfolded and disposed between the parties of a conflict, usually 
after a ceasefire. In this case, the peacekeeping force employs its weapons only in self-defense, and it is only 
established with the host country's consent and, most often, it is not made with troops from major powers. 
9
 Unequivocal examples of the conception of these peacekeeping operations occurred in Namibia (UNTAG), 
Cambodia (UNTAC), Angola (UNAVEM I and II), El Salvador (ONUSAL) and in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). 
In these cases, the peace process was initiated with the establishment of a cease fire by certain large peace 
agreements, in which the troops for peacekeeping would be deployed to the affected areas with the consent of the 
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Malan, means peace operations developed in association with the order of the remaining 
conflicts of the Cold War, in which the UN, or other international organization, negotiates 
political solutions based on mutual opponents‘ commitment. 
According to Michael Barnett, PKO and peace enforcement operations are the 
second phase of peace operations, given that they consider "internal security" and "domestic 
order" relevant for the maintenance of regional and international security. Barnett states that if 
the majority of peace operations before 1988 regards the transition from decolonization to 
legal sovereignty, almost all of them since then, concerns the transition from civil war to civil 
society, reflecting a shift in the conceptualization of how best encourage a stable peace system 
and the appropriate means to accomplish it. (Barnett, 1995: p.415) 
After the second generation, the UN became involved with the completion of internal 
conflicts and the assignment of multidimensional peacekeepers troops‘ tasks, which usually 
include activities such as separation of combatants, disarmament of irregular forces, 
demobilization and transformation of regular and irregular forces into a unified army, 
assistance for the reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society, establishment of new 
systems of policing or police institutions, and  monitoring of elections for new governments. 
However, on same decade, still in 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali classified 
missions approved under Chapter VII as the "third generation" of PKO, multilateral and 
multidimensional, characterized by the involvement with protection of civilians and 
diversified mandates, related to the new wars‘ characteristics.
 10 
(UNDPKO, 2013) Defined by 
the difficulties of traditional distinctions between victim and aggressor, public and private, 
war crime and crime, "the new conflicts have led to impasses related to the three guiding 
principles of PKO: the parties consent, impartiality/neutrality, and the use of force only in 
exceptional cases, which were "discussed later in the Brahimi report of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). 
In recent decades, the "third generation" of PKO represented by consensus at the 
United Nations has developed as the main response to systematic violations of human rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
agreements parties. It is also part of this phase, the controversial operations in Bosnia (UNPROFOR), Somalia 
(UNOSOM I and II), and Rwanda (UNAMIR), which did not obtain the same level of consent and cooperation 
of the parties.   
10
 The United Nations defines "multidimensional" missions those operations "designed to ensure the 
implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and help to lay the foundation for sustainable peace." 
Unlike "traditional" missions, which only involve military tasks, multidimensional missions are complex 
operations ranging from the military apparatus to civilian organizations with the objective of "helping to 
establish governments, monitor compliance with human rights, ensure sectorial reforms, disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants." 
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and threats to international peace and security.
11
 The political effort to prevent humanitarian 
disasters, in order to protect the individual, within the recent perception that the human being 
and human rights should be valued in international politics, became commitment on the world 
stage and gave rise to the concept of "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P). (Weiss, 2004) Kenkel 
affirms that the combination of the extended use of force and the largest civilian capacity to 
work in operations and temporary mandates designated the fourth generation of UN PKO. 
(Kenkel, 2013: p.132) 
In consonance with the author, the fourth generation of UN PKO differs from the 
second and third generations as it consists of robust reconstruction operations and combines 
the use of force with more intrusive civilian tasks on issues related to local autonomy. Once 
these missions have conceptual basis relatively prone to the use of force, this factor is a 
paradigm. The controversy here is related to the use of force and the reconstruction of peace, 
in this case, they are implemented by actors with different backgrounds, agendas and political 
goals.
12
 (Kenkel, 2013: p.134) 
The combination of these elements gave rise to what some international relations 
experts termed as "hybrid operation" or fifth generation of UN PKO. According to Kenkel, 
these operations provide troops and police under joint command of the UN and regional 
organizations. These operations are characterized by separate chain of command and 
segregated mandates.
13
 (Kenkel, 2013: p.134) In general, they reflect the current division of 
labor of the global system of peace operations involving humanitarian, political and military 
aspects, each one with their respective responsibilities in the peace reconstruction process.
14
 
                                                          
11
 In 1994, Bouttros Bouttros-Ghali announced that peacekeeping operations would become the United Nations 
priority, with about 70,000 troops in 17 operations around the world. In 2013, the DPKO stated that 117 
countries contributed troops, a total of 97,157 personnel in 16 peace operations. Available from: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml. Accessed in 5
th
 October  
2014. 
12
 ―According to Kenkel, peacebuilding operations, as noted above, combine a high potential level of use of 
force with a number of intrusive political tasks; indeed the same liberal paradigm that gives these missions their 
conceptual base appears to present a relatively high propensity towards the use of force for intervention. Here, as 
Richmond points out, one of the major problems is that the use of force and peacebuilding‘s civilian, non-
military tasks are carried out by different actors with different origins, agendas, and political goals (Richmond, 
2004, 84, 87).‖ 
13
 To Kenkel ―what sets this type of mission apart is its hybrid character—these missions deploy troops and 
police personnel under mixed command, with both the United Nations and various regional organizations 
deploying troops to the same missions under separate chains of command and distinct forms of mandate. 
Differently from a Chapter VIII mission and its time-limited ‗farming-out‘ of primarily peace-enforcement, 
high-use of force mandates, hybrid missions involve the simultaneous deployment of UN troops and those of a 
regional organization. These missions reflect a growing shift in the division of labor in the global system of 
peace operations.‖  
14
 The humanitarian, political and military aspects and their respective responsibilities in the process of peace 
building were highlighted in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations report, titled "The New Horizon 
report."   
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UNAMID (African Union and the United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur), AMIS 
(African Union Mission in Sudan) and MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti) are characterized as examples of these types of missions. 
Hybrid operations are the result of human rights and human security‘s debate in the 
1990s. Concerns along the contributions inherited from these debates - formulated by Bernard 
Kouchner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France from 2007 and 2010, and Tony Blair, British 
Prime Minister between 1997 and 2007 - emphasized the international community 
commitment to discuss how and when it should intervene and use force in cases of systematic 
violation of human rights.
15
 The fifth paragraph of UN Resolution 1296 of 2000 went further, 
noting that: 
The deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other protected persons and the 
committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict may constitute a 
threat to international peace and security (…) readiness to consider such situations 
and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate steps. (S/RES/1296, 2000) 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) stressed in its Human 
Development Report, 1994, that remote security policies diverge from traditional concept of 
"security by weapons" in order to focus attention on human security. Two human security 
concepts were proposed: the first one emphasized the protection from physical violence or 
"freedom from fear"; the second, a more general concept related to the possibility of threat to 
human dignity, adding "freedom from want", considered the security against poverty and the 
threat of war or violent conflict, and the population survival in which each individual should 
be respected. The report added further that "human insecurity is the violation of human rights 
perpetrated by States or non-State actors in cases of war or independent of it." 
Nonetheless, critics argue that the generality of the human security concept and its 
association with development ideas make the first one analytically weak, especially due to the 
fact that any event could be declared a security problem. In this sense, if all challenging 
events can be perceived as a potential security problem, it would be almost impossible to 
prioritize what really means a threat. As stated by Thiago Rodrigues (2012), 
the expansion of the security concept, thus, implied recognition of a new subject of 
security - the people - and a new more varied and extensive security object, 
combining threats that affect directly the individuals (eg, ethnic violence or 
genocides perpetrated by a State) or indirectly (such as scarcity of resources derived 
from environmental degradation).
16
 (Rodrigues, 2012: p. 16) 
                                                          
15
 "In January 2008, 119 countries were contributing military and police to UN peacekeeping operations." 
16
 ―A ampliação do conceito de segurança, portanto, implicou no reconhecimento de um novo sujeito de 
segurança – as populações – e de um novo objeto de segurança mais variado e extenso, combinando ameaças 
provocadas diretamente sobre os indivíduos (por exemplo, a violência étnica ou genocídios perpetrados por um 
Estado) ou indiretamente (como a escassez de recursos derivada da degradação ambiental).‖  
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Human security concept application in PKO is seen in the PoC‘s implementation. 
PoC‘s definition has not yet been determined by the UN Security Council. However, in 
September 1999, the Council adopted Resolution 1265, which expressed the international 
community‘s will to consider taking appropriate measures and to respond to situations of 
armed conflict where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian assistance is being 
deliberately obstructed.
17
 The resolution also warned States to ratify threats to human rights 
and prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations 
of international humanitarian law. Finally, the Council expressed its willingness to explore 
PKO mandates and to restructure the concept of PoC. 
The Asia-Pacific Center's report for the Responsibility to Protect entitled "The 
Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians: Asia-Pacific in the UN Security 
Council" (2009), organized, in five specific issues, a list of necessary steps to apply the 
outlines action on PoC: 
 
1) Provision of appropriate security arrangements. 
2) Engagement in dialogue with belligerents. 
3) Facilitation of humanitarian assistance development. 
4) Humanitarian personnel safety and security. 
5) Compliance with legal international obligations. 
 
In April 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report on the PoC focused on its 
operational aspects in order to improve the ability of the forces in PKO for the protection of 
civilians. Along the UNSC‘s recommendations, these initiatives produced a memorandum on 
PoC, attached to the Council President's speech on March 15
th
, 2002, and updated by the 
Department for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2004. (A/63/677, 2009: 
para. 44)  
In agreement with the UN DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS) concept 
note, the PoC concept will last for a long time. It will be based on lessons learned and will 
provide general strategies for its application. In addition, the concept note stressed that the 
PoC‘s operationalization in peace operations is organized following three lines: 
 
1) Protect through political process; 
                                                          
17
 Specific descriptions of the emergency of the Protection of Civilians concept in the Security Council are 
available on the Security Council report entitled "Protection of Civilians," No. 2. 14
th
 October 2008. 
 Graziene Carneiro de Souza  440 
BJIR, Marília, v. 5, n. 2, p. 432-453, mai/ago. 2016 
2) Provide protection of physical violence; and 




Pursuant to Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, UN documents cover two types of 
protection activities: those related to the military forces positioning between the civilian 
population and those that threat them, in order to deter and respond to attacks; and second, 
those related to developed measures to eliminate or restrict the activities of armed groups that 
threat civilians.
19
 (Bellamy, Williams, 2011: p.849) 
According to the UN Peacekeeping Operations: principles and guidelines handbook‘s 
concept (2008), although the PoC‘s agenda requires coordinated and concentrated military 
action, its operation needs to be integrated into a joint implementation plan with NGOs and 
other agencies of the United Nations‘ system. It should encompass wide variety of activities 
related to the Security Council on measures agreed with Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN 
Charter, as the activities related to other institutions, involving various government actors, 
organized armed groups, UN institutions and NGOs. (S/RES/ 1265, 1999) 
In order to engage PoC under threat of physical violence, peace operations have a 
specific mandate based on the characteristics of each case. In every part of the world, regional 
organizations together with specialized UN bodies agree and establish plans and policies for 
PKO grounded in international law and endorsed by UN General Assembly and UNSC.
20
 
These plans and policies on PoC are detailed in the rules of engagement (ROE) of 
each mission. Currently, the most specific doctrine on these ROE was meticulous studied in a 
military planning handbook called Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) of the 
United States of America‘s Department of Defense (JP 3-07.3), whose main objective is the 
debate on how civilians can be protected.
21
 
                                                          
18
 Draft DPKO/FDS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations. 
19
 ―These guidelines have sketched two types of protection activities: positioning military forces between the 
civilian population and those that threaten them in order to deter and respond to attacks; and taking measures 
designed to eliminate or restrict the activities of armed groups that threaten civilians.‖  
20
 This resulted in the need for the Secretary-General to regularly report on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict. The Security Council has since adopted four resolutions specifically noting the protection of civilians 
(1265, 1296, 1674, 1738). Resolutions on women (1325), children (1612), protection for humanitarian experts 
(1502), conflict prevention (1625), and sexual exploitation (1820), also include the protection of civilians in 
conflict. 
21
 MARO sketches ways ‗to halt widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups 
against non-combatants‘ in contexts characterized by multiparty dynamics between victims, perpetrators and 
bystanders rather than traditional contexts between enemy and friendly forces; where the intervening force will 
inevitably be seen as siding with the victims against the perpetrators; and where there is a tendency for mass 
killings to rapidly escalate once begun. 
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More than protection against the threat of physical violence, most part of peace 
operations serves to facilitate the stabilization and consolidation of State authority, to 
collaborate in processes of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) and 
DDRRR (Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement); and to promote the 
reform of the security sector and perform related tasks, for example, the violation of human 
rights and sexual violence. Although the comprehension of the PoC concept remains the same 
in the case of MONUSCO, the creation of its FIB and the authorization to use of force began, 
we advocate here, a new approach in the protection of physical violence. 
In sum, over the five generations of UN PKO, the Organization performance adapted 
to the context of new conflicts and wars. First generation aimed monitoring ceasefires, truces 
and armistices, patrolling borders and excluded military zones, supporting the withdrawal of 
troops and monitoring of negotiations for definitive peace treaties. Second generations meant 
peace operations developed in association with the order of the remaining conflicts of the 
Cold War, in which the UN, or other international organization, negotiated political solutions 
based on mutual opponents‘ commitment. Third generation, multilateral and 
multidimensional, was characterized by the involvement with PoC and diversified mandates, 
related to the new wars‘ characteristics. Fourth generation consisted of robust reconstruction 
operations and combined the use of force with more intrusive civilian tasks on issues related 
to local autonomy. Fifth generation or "hybrid operations" provide troops and police under 
joint command of the UN and regional organizations, characterized by separate chain of 
command and segregated mandates. 
 
3) MONUSCO’s case: the Force Intervention Brigade’s originality in the protection of 
civilians. 
 
The debate on humanitarian intervention is broad. According to Tardy, the UN PKO 
are the main conceptual ambiguity in the use of force and its Charter. (Tardy, 2007) It is 
widely known that PKO are not mentioned in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, they are "legally" 
understood between its Chapters VI, VII and VIII, conditioned to the UNSC approval. 
(Brownlie, 2008: p.747) 
Throughout the process of PKO evolution, its three guiding principles (consensus, 
impartiality and minimum use of force) have been adapted to the needs of immediate 
responses to new threats and conflicts. In this context, UN operations as in the cases of Haiti 
(1990-1997), Somalia (1992-1995), the former Yugoslavia (1992-1995), Rwanda (1993-
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1996) and Sierra Leone (1998-2005 ), despite planned to respond to different local contexts, 
they are examples of missions that initially had a non-coercive multidimensional mandate 
and, due to the escalation of violence, incorporated imposition elements to try to overcome 
worsening situations of aggression, crimes against humanity and human rights abuses. 
The latest innovation and unprecedented UNSC response occurred in 2013, through 
Resolution 2098, which established the creation of the FIB in MONUSCO with a mandate to 
perform offensive operations.
22
 The resolution was an attempt to highlight the causes of 
conflict and ensure sustainable peace both domestically and in the region. (S/2013/131, 2013: 
para.5) 
MONUSCO is authorized to use all necessary means to achieve and operationalize 
its mandate, highlighting, among other aspects, the PoC, humanitarian personnel and human 
rights officers, under threat of physical violence, as well to support the FARDC (Democratic 
Republic of Congo Armed Forces) and the DRC government in efforts to stabilize and 
consolidate peace. Resolution 2098 strongly condemned the March 23 Movement (M23), the 
Democratic Forces for Liberation of Rwanda (RDLR), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 
and "all other armed groups and their continuing violations and abuses of human rights". 
(S/RES/2098, 2013) The FIB is controlled directly by the MONUSCO Force Commander and 
consists of three infantry battalions, one artillery, one special forces and one reconnaissance 
company all them based in Goma. It is responsible for neutralizing armed groups and aims to 
contribute for the reduction of threats posed by armed groups to State authority and civilians‘ 
security in eastern DRC. In consonance with the scenario of operation, FIB‘s mandate is 
responsible to: 
Carry out offensive operations, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a 
robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with 
international law, including international humanitarian law (...) to prevent the 
expansion of all armed groups, neutralize the groups, and to disarm them (…). 
(S/RES/2098, 2013: para. 9) 
FIB is the first offensive combat group created by the UNSC to conduct military 
actions against armed groups in the DRC. Some authors consider that, in the history of PKO 
under the auspices of the UN, the presence of forces with this type of conformation and 
mandate was used in the cases of Somalia and Haiti. (Blyth, 2013) However, according to 
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 The Security Council Resolution 1925 of July 1st, 2010 renamed the MONUCO - Mission of the United 
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Priscilla Fett, these two cases "do not serve as comparative basis" since both of them 
represent a stabilization mission model, not being "suitable to cope with the violence levels 
found in the African country." (Fett, 2013) 
Within the UNDPKO, the debate on robust operations is not new. It enhances 
discussions about the legitimacy of offensive action and the use of force limits exerted by 
multinational operations. In the case of MONUSCO, the debate refers to the correlation 
between the three guiding principles of peace operations and the implementation of the FIB‘s 
mandate. In Resolution 2098, FIB was initially authorized under an exceptional basis, without 
creating any precedent or prejudice to the principles of UN PKO. 
In line with the UN Capstone Doctrine, peace operations are deployed with the 
consent of the main conflict parties.
 23
 In the DRC, MONUSCO obtained consent of the 
Congolese Government, while, the other conflict party, namely ―the illegal armed groups‖ 
were considered the main threat to the security of the population. In this sense, it was not 
convenient to seek their consent since those illegal armed groups were the "enemy" party. The 
UN Capstone Doctrine also elucidated that mandate‘s impartiality should be implemented 
without favors or prejudices to either party. In MONUSCO, the principle of 
impartiality/neutrality was emptied when the UN Security Council identified the conflict 
parties and decided "to authorize the FIB to use all necessary means to achieve and 
operationalize its mandate," supporting the State sovereignty and DRC Government in the 
efforts of peace stabilization and consolidation. 
The very creation of the FIB interferes directly into the most controversial principle 
of peace operations, the use of force. In the DRC, the use of force in unilateral offensive 
actions or together with the FARDC, in a robust and versatile way to neutralize armed groups, 
causes changes in the three pillars‘ understanding. The principle of non-use of force, except in 
self-defense, date to the first deployment of UN armed peacekeepers in 1956. Nonetheless, 
throughout the evolution of peace operations, peacekeeping operations, as mentioned above, 
started to employ, occasionally, the use of force, as in Congo between 1960 and 1964, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1992-1995, in Somalia between 1993 and 1995, and 
recently in Haiti between 2007 and 2009. Although they follow the stabilization mission 
model and do not have the same levels of violence found in the DRC, the UNSC, in line with 
the principle of self-defense, allowed the use of limited force in those operations. 
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  The Capstone Doctrine is a document of the UNDPKO, produced in 2008, which contains the principles and 
general guidelines on UN peacekeeping operations.  
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In DRC, the UNSC observed the difficulty of its military component to anticipate to 
threats and to act proactively in order to reduce vulnerabilities and deter armed groups. 
Therefore, further update, adaptation and evolution were needed to achieve effective PoC. 
Composed by 3,069 soldiers from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania, FIB‘s mandate 
changed the implementation of PoC. If earlier, the blue helmets watched static to human 
rights abuses, sexual violence and crimes against humanity; in the DRC, the FIB 
operationalized preemptive action in order to prevent such violations. The robust operations 
applied in consonance with intelligence and technological resources, such as drones, used for 
the first time in PKO, have enabled positive results in the PoC. 
As reported by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations (SRSG), Martin Kobler, in its Declaration "Building on the momentum" to the UNSC 
on March 14
th
, 2014, important actions were developed. The defeat of the M23, the joint 
operations against the Democratic Forces of Rwanda - FDLR and the Allied Democratic 
Forces - ADF, and the return of security to the liberated territories have contributed to the 




Offensive military actions performed by FIB indorsed a new approach on PoC. 
Although MONUSCO operates PoC within a new context, the mission follows the DPKO 
lines of action, protecting through the political process; providing protection of physical 
violence; and, establishing a protected environment for the civilian population. 
The "Islands of Stability‖ concept was created by Martin Kobler to concentrate 
military, political and humanitarian efforts in a given area, based on the MONUSCO 
priorities: first, the protection and safety of civilians; second, the stabilization of conflict-
affected areas; and third, the process of reform and implementation of peace, security and 
cooperation framework. 
"Islands of Stability" is a process, initiated by robust actions of the military 
component. In its first stage, the PoC is related to the physical protection of people, pursued 
through FIB‘s robust operations and not only by the UN peacekeepers presence. The Military 
Force Commander, Brazilian Army Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, 
emphasized that the best PoC, regarding the physical protection, is related to the identification 
of the threat, their elimination or neutralization. 
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It is necessary to identify the violence that is not related to social dynamics, which is 
a police case and not a military strategy, but the one that is a consequence of social 
deformation and results on the formation of armed groups. An active approach is 
needed. The presence may cause deterrent, but alone, it is not effective. Presence 
and dynamic of actions are necessary. Our goal in MONUSCO is the protection of 
civilians through action, not just the presence. Presence follows the traditional 
model, and in this case, the military contingent is passive, it only responds and do 
not anticipate. This is not ideal. Long time without action, first, prevents the 
presence to be a deterrent because it is believed that the mission will not act. And 
second, it is a demoralizing process. The military contingent dissuades the aggressor 
when the last one believes the mission will act if he tries to do something. We want 




In the case of the ―Islands of Stability‖ strategy, military actions dissuade armed 
groups and release dominated areas, allowing the return of civilian population and the 
restoration of State authority. This process is supported by NGOs, United Nations agencies 
and institutions working in peacebuilding. According to Martin Kobler, the overall goal of 
"Islands of Stability" is to avoid the immediate relapse of the communities involved in a cycle 
of violence after armed groups released a given area. The SRSG states that ―robust protection 
and hard-won stability is the basis for building peace.‖
26
 
In DRC, a set of actions enabled the State authority return to those areas previously 
dominated, they are: definition of the conflict‘s causes, parties and threat identification, and 
robust actions against armed groups. This is the case of Kiwanja-Rutshuru, where advances 
have succeeded in installing police units supported by UNPOL (UN Police), in return of 
territorial administration and civil servants, in the rehabilitation of the justice, police, and 
administration buildings, and in the reopening of the city jail. 
MONUSCO‘s transformation in a field mission transferred its headquarters, formerly 
in Kinshasa, capital of DRC, to the east, in the city of Goma. It was an attempt to strengthen 
support to field operations in that part of the country. As a result, the establishment of the 
permanent presence of UN civilian personnel in the worst affected areas, such as in the cities 
of Rutshuru, Masisi and Walikale, confirms the new reconfiguration of the MONUSCO 
mandate interpretation and its influence on the PoC‘s implementation. 
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 ―É necessário identificar a violência que não está relacionada à dinâmica social, a qual é um caso policial e 
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aconteça.‖ Interview conducted by the author with the Military Force Commander of MONUSCO, Division 
Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, on September 4
th
 2014, in Goma, North Kivu, DRC. 
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The joint effort in the whole process was mentioned by Martin Kobler. According to 
the SRSG, "the use of force alone does not achieve sustainable results if not embedded in a 
political context." Well defined in the motto of the Mission - "One Mandate, One mission, 
One force" - the political, military and humanitarian aspects concentrate efforts on one unique 
dynamic. The MONUSCO political action is committed to the pursuit of partnerships in the 
international community, legitimacy, UNSC support and closer connections with the DRC 
government in an effort to coordinate, especially the reform of the security sector, DDR and 
DDRRR process. The military component is committed to manage combined actions with the 
FARDC in order to perform promptly and ensure PoC. Humanitarian agencies works on 
issues such as human rights, sexual violence, poverty, education and health service delivery 
with immediate impact (Quick Impact Project - QIP). 
Although robust actions have not caused side effects on the humanitarian aspect and 
its influence on PoC, MONUSCO‘s mandate has generated discussions about its duplication. 
MONUSCO is a peculiar mission, not only because it is authorized to use force against armed 
groups but also due to the way it is coordinated. The manner how its mandate is interpreted 
became, if not the most important factor, very influential on its results. The SRSG Martin 
Kobler, the Military Force Commander, Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz 
and the Deputy SRSG and UN Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator, and 
Resident Representative of UNDP Moustapha Soumaré, along with other Mission‘s 
coordinators, systematized a concise and cohesive interpretation on the three PKO aspects. 
As stated in the DPKO Concept Note on PoC, the implementation of PoC should 
include "all activities related to protection in the mandate and envisioned for PKO, and allow 
enough flexibility to the diversity of contexts in which each mission operates."
27
 
The mandate‘s interpretation by MONUSCO's leaders helped to diversify PoC before 
the use of force. In the context of DRC, the concept of "Islands of Stability" could be created 
due to political arrangements between MONUSCO and the Congolese government. The 
identification of threat allowed the establishment of objectives, the decision to support the 
Congolese government permitted that these objectives were achieved promptly, and the use of 
force authorization to perform unilateral offensive attacks along with FARDC enabled the 
implementation of ―Islands Stability‖. 
 Nowadays, there are ten UN PKO under aegis of mandates to protect civilians.  It is 
important to recognize that the duplication of the MONUSCO‘s model could be very 
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dangerous if regional and local political arrangements are not considered in each case. The 
positive results of FIB offensive actions are still recent. However, it is possible to observe 
similarities in the mandate of MINUSMA (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali). 
UNSC Resolution 2100 (April 2013) allowed MINUSMA to adopt offensive military 
objectives in order to stabilize population centers. The resolution consented hybrid military 
response, linking the international stabilization to French forces with multiple objectives, 
including the creation of safe environment for the humanitarian assistance passage. 
(S/RES/2100, 2013) 
UNSC Resolution 2102 (May 2013) regarding Somalia aimed at aligning the UN 
personnel activities (UN country team) to UNSOM goals (United Nations Assistance Mission 
in Somalia) and the Somalia Federal Government‘s activities to the PoC‘s implementation. 
(S/RES/2102, 2013) Similarly, UNSC Resolution 2155 (May 2014) on South Sudan modified 
the mandate of UNMISS (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan), focusing 
on PoC‘s actions in order to solve humanitarian needs and security issues. (S/RES/2155, 
2014) 
These resolutions endorse the UN involvement in conflict under a new perspective. 
The UNSC Report on PoC in Armed Conflict analyzed the ―strengths and weaknesses of the 
Council‘s engagement, recognizing that the complex security and political environment has 
made protecting civilians and finding a solution to the conflict extremely difficult.‖ (UNSC, 
2015) Considering the complexity of all elements surrounding peace operations, for example: 
the political will of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), the risks on active engagement, the 
efficiency of the military actions‘ results, the political, humanitarian and military effort and 
actions related to PoC, and the peace stabilization and reconstruction in the context of peace 




Nowadays, peace operations are the main international community´s response to 
crimes against humanity, genocide, ethnic cleansing, extreme violence and conflict. It reflects 
the importance that human equality and human rights gradually has had in international 
politics. As Finnemore affirms, this understanding has profound impacts on military 
intervention, modifying its justification and changing the debate on where and how to 
intervene. (Finnemore, 2004: p. 20) 
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The emergence of "Islands of Stability" is another example of this alteration. The 
new concept represents the PoC dynamic view, more flexible and adapted to DRC context 
and, in particular, to the threat posed by armed groups. As mentioned above, this new 
interpretation of PoC will influence not only the way peace operations are conducted, but also 
how humanitarian agencies operate and humanitarian assistance is managed.  
Due to these update, adaptation and evolution, the three original guiding principles of 
peace operations started to be de-emphasized. Consequently, new understandings on parties 
consent, impartiality/neutrality, and the use of force must be identified. Specific studies on 
cases of MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSMA and UNSOM will be needed to cover the 
breadth and complexity of these conflicts and the necessity to use force in order to designate 
appropriate responses from the international community. 
Many authors and specialists disagreed with the "Islands of Stability" concept 
introduced by Martin Kobler. The criticisms were focused especially on peace reconstruction, 
stabilization and restoration. These include critics of the civil-military relationship, the linking 
of humanitarian personnel to military operations, its ability to restore state authority, the 
limited capacity of FIB to achieve its goal and the difficulty of carrying out DDR and 
DDRRR processes. Moreover, comments on the lack of clarity regarding the ROE of the 
MONUSCO mandate, especially related to the PoC, were launched. (Ponthieu, Christoph, 
Derderian, 2014) Considering it is the first peace operation to have an authorized military unit 
to use force preemptively and that DPKO guides and strategies are built on lessons learned, 
ROE of missions‘ mandate such as MONUSCO will take some time to be solidified. 
Although the use of force has been authorized by the UNSC in different cases, it is 
clear that it is not the solution to conflicts. Nevertheless, if it is approved on the basis of 
collective security, it is initially a way that allows deep-rooted problems in society find 
political, economic and social answers. In the case of DRC, PoC‘s implementation was 
adapted to the conflict reality. The legitimate use of force operationalized by FIB diversified 
the way that protection against physical violence is conducted. "Islands of Stability" recent 
concept promises evolution towards a new peace operation process. Moreover, it initiates a 
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